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ESCOBEDO AND MIRANDA REVISITED
by
ARTHUR

J. GOLDBERGW

Shortly before the close of the 1983 term, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided two cases, U.S. v. Gouveial and New York v. Quarles2 ,
which in effect overruled Escobedo v. Illinois' and undermined Miranda v.
Arizona'.
In a somewhat cavalier fashion, Justice Rehnquist dismissed both of these
opinions in a footnote which reads:
The only arguable deviations from consistent line of cases are Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). Although there may be some language to the contrary in United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), we have made clear that we required
counsel in Miranda and Escobedo in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination rather than to vindicate the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291; 300 n. 4 (1980); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 689; Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729-730 (1966).'
In this footnote, and, in the body of the Gouveia opinion, Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, is in error on several grounds.
Escobedo was not a fifth amendment case. Indeed the fifth amendment
was never mentioned in the Court's opinion. It was plainly and simply a sixth
amendment case.
In the opening words of the Escobedo opinion, the Court said:
The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the
refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his
lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of 'the
Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, and thereby renders in-
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admissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement elicited by
the police during the interrogation.6
In concluding the opinion, which I wrote for a majority of the Court, I
said:
Nothing we have said today affects the powers of the police to investigate
'an unsolved crime,' Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), by gathering information from witnesses and by other investigative efforts.' Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519. We hold
only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when
its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our
adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here,
the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.
To compound the footnote error Judge Rehnquist also, speaking for the
Court, said that "The right of counsel does not attach until the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings," i.e. until an indictment has been brought
In Escobedo, however, the Court said:
The interrrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally indicted. But in the context of this case, the fact should make no difference.
When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer, the investigation has ceased to be a general investigation
of 'an unsolved crime'. Id., at 485 (citation omitted) (quoting Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1960) (Stewart, J., concurring)).9
It is simply not possible to explain the difference in these holdings by
describing Escobedo as an "arguable deviation."'" The only tenable explanation is that Gouveia overrules Escobedo.
The facts in Gouveia illuminate that this is indeed so. The record and the
fact findings of the trial District Judge, and the court of appeals reviewing this
decision, disclose that the respondents in Gouveia were committed to administrative detention because "the finger of suspicion" was pointed at them
and that they were put in solitary and interrogated, not to promote prison
discipline, nor to ensure prison security, but because they were the prime
suspects to the murders of fellow inmates.
Although they were thus fingered as the accused and intensely interrogated, they were not indicted until months later, although some of the respondents were in administrative detention for almost nineteen months. During
"378 U.S. 478. 479 11964).
378 U.S. 478 492 119641.
104 S.Ct. 2292. 2298 (19841.
'378 U.S. 478. 485 11964).
1'104 S. Ct. 2292. 2298 n. 5 (19841.
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this period, because they were indigents, and thus could not afford lawyers,
these inmates were denied the right of counsel in violation of the Escobedo
holding. But, as I have pointed out, Justice Rehnquist dismisses their sixth
amendment claim because he believes that the sixth amendment right of
counsel does not attach until indictment.
Escobedo was one of the Warren Court's outstanding decisions. If overruled, as it was in Gouveia, it was entitled to a more seemly demise than that
accorded by a cursory reference and an erroneous footnote.
In deciding the Quarles case during the final days of the 1983 Term, the
Court once again ignored prior caselaw, in that instance Miranda,to limit still
further the rights of criminal suspects.
Miranda was a fifth amendment case, as was Quarles. Quarles was tried in
a New York court for rape and illegal possession of a gun. The relevant facts
are stated in the opinion of the Court.
A young woman approached police officers who were on patrol, in a
police car, in Queens, New York. She told them she had just been raped by a
black male. She further reported to the officers that the man had just entered
an A&P supermarket located nearby and that he was carrying a gun. The officers accompanied the woman to the supermarket, and one of the officers
entered the store while the other radioed for assistance. The officer entered the
store quickly and spotted the respondent, who matched the description given
by the woman.
Upon seeing the officer, the respondent turned and ran to the rear of the
store. The arresting officer pursued him with a drawn gun. He apprehended
the suspect, frisked him and discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder
holster. After handcuffing him, the arresting officer ordered him to disclose
where the gun was. Respondent pointed to some empty cartons and responded
"the gun is over there."" The officer, thereupon retrieved a loaded revolver
from one of the cartons, formally placed respondent under arrest and then read
him his Miranda rights from a printed card.
Respondent then, in response to further questions, confessed that he
owned the gun and had purchased it in Florida. Despite this obvious Miranda
violation, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the Miranda
warning was not required when interrogation commenced because of the
"good faith" of the arresting officers based on their justifiable concern "for the
public safety."
Justice Rehnquist explained that "whatever the motivation of individual
officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings
of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which
"104 S. Ct. 2626, 2628 11984).
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police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety."'"
Inasmuch as the suspect was handcuffed and a body search indicated that
he had no other weapons, the public safety explanation is not credible.
The only tenable conclusion is that the Court is determined to limit or
overrule Miranda by erosion.
The decisions Justice Rehnquist cites in Gouveia in support of the view he
expressed for the Court, that in virtually all cases an indictment is required
before the sixth amendment right to counsel can be invoked are inapposite. 3
In support of his holding, Justice Rehnquist cites a statement from Kirby
v. Illinois'4 that the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated." But as Justice Stevens
noted in his concurring opinion on Gouveia, the plurality opinion in Kirby was
not joined by a majority of the Court.'5 The same is true of the passage quoted
by Justice Rehnquist from United States v. Mandujano. 16 Two other decisions
relied upon by Justice Rehnquist, Estelle v. Smith 7 and Moore v. Illinois", in
Justice Stevens apt analysis, "merely describe what the Kirby plurality had required for the Sixth Amendment to attach, and held that the plurality's test
was satisfied."' 9 Moreover, as Justice Stevens further observed, in neither
Estelle nor Moore did the Court consider whether the right to counsel could attach "prior to the point identified by the Kirby plurality."'" Rehnquist cited one
other case in support of his view, Brewer v. Williams2 , but this case left the
question open, and therefore, adds no support to his conclusion.
Faced with the Court decision in Escobedo that contradicts his own interpretation, Justice Rehnquist dismissed Escobedo, and also Miranda, which
reaffirmed the Escobedo holding as "arguable deviations." The words
"arguable deviations" seems to me a sleight of hand to obscure the Court's effort to overrule Escobedo and circumscribe Miranda.
'104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632 11984).
'1104 S. Ct. 2292, 2298 (1984).
"406 U.S. 682 (1972).
"104 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 n. 3 (1984).
'"425 U.S. 564 (1976).
"1451 U.S. 454 (1981).
'"434 U.S. 220 (1977).
'1104 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 n. 3 (1984).

'ld.
U.S. 387 (1977). In Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), the Court held that the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
The Court did not directly address the issue of at what point the right to counsel attaches, but found that
there was no unfairness where the State and the accused are placed in the same position they would have
been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place.
1104 S. Ct. 2292, 2298 n. 5 11984).
2430
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Justice Rehnquist's dismissal of Escobedo may stem, in part, from the
Miranda decision's references to the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination, as well as the sixth amendment requirement of the assistance of
counsel.

The Miranda Court expressly reaffirmed its previous holding in
Escobedo, but Miranda's emphasis on warnings, while welcome, may unfortunately have served to dilute the essential premise of Escobedo.
Miranda holds that a criminal suspect's constitutional rights can be protected by a warning alone against self incrimination, provided the warning is
accompanied by an affirmation of the right to counsel. This was not the
holding of Escobedo, which explicitly stated that the sixth amendment right to
the assistance of counsel guarantees this right to criminals, who are the prime
suspects, before interrogation.
I do not mean by this to denigrate the value of Miranda warnings. Warnings, including the reference to right of counsel, are useful and may indeed protect a citizen from unwittingly incriminating himself. Warnings are, however,
far less important than the absolute right to the assistance of counsel during
pretrial interrogation of a suspect who is the focus of a criminal investigation.
Miranda warnings, as experience teaches, have limited utility. Lay persons, in police custody, simply cannot anticipate how what they agree to say
will be used against them later. Such suspects, more often than not, do not
comprehend the significance of a Miranda warning, because they lack the legal
training or often even literacy needed to understand the different ways
statements can incriminate them.
Further, we have no way of knowing what else the police may have added
after a Miranda warning. A most common statement by police, almost never
taped or admitted, is that if the suspect "cooperates" the police will intercede
for a lighter sentence.
In Escobedo, for example, the suspect was told that if he fingered the person who actually pulled the trigger, he would be sent home, in disregard of the
well settled rule that all participants in a felony resulting in a murder are equally guilty of this grave crime, although he did not use or even possess the
murder weapon. More than a warning, what a criminal suspect needs, and
under the sixth amendment is entitled to, is the assistance of counsel before indictment and trial.
If the suspect does not receive such assistance and unwittingly makes a
statement in which he implicates himself, the assistance of counsel at trial may
do no good because the trial's outcome may well have become a foregone conclusion. The trial, thereby loses its significance and is reduced simply to an appeal from the pretrial interrogation. The Soviets use such an approach in their
criminal justice system but it does not follow, however, that we should do the
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
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same. Such an approach is completely inconsistent with our belief in the rule of
law and in the safeguards of our cherished Bill of Rights.
Realistically, only the assistance of counsel, who can explain fully to the
suspect the possible legal ramifications of any admission, can prevent criminal
trials from evolving into a pro forma ratification of prior police investigations.
It would seem apparent that Escobedo has been overruled by Gouveia.
And it also seems that Quarles grants law enforcement officers a "good faith"
exemption from the Miranda ruling, thus limiting Miranda's application. Most
police officers believer that they act in good faith and with justifiable concern
for the public safety in disregarding what they term "legalism," an inapt
characterization of a Miranda warning. Juries, more often than not, accept the
police testimony rather than that of the person in the dock who rarely looks or
talks like a law abiding citizen.
In sum, it appears to me, that the present Court has consigned Escobedo
to the ash heap of legal history and Miranda is twisting slowly in the wind.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol18/iss2/1

6

